Political Leadership as Statecraft? Aligning Theory with Praxis in Conversation with British Party Leaders by James, Toby S.
Political Leadership as Statecraft? 




How should prime ministerial and party leadership be understood and assessed?  One 
leading approach posits that we should assess them in terms of whether they achieve 
statecraft, that is, winning and maintain office in government. This article supplements 
and then assesses that theory by drawing from Pawson and Tilley’s (1997) concept of the 
realistic interview, in which practitioners are deployed as co-researchers to assess and 
revise theory.  Unprecedented interviews with British party leaders were therefore 
undertaken.  The article provides new empirical support for the framework because many 
of the key generative mechanisms identified within the neo-statecraft model were 
present in an analysis of the interviews. The interviews also allowed the limitations of the 
model to be demarcated.  Statecraft focusses purely on cunning leadership where the 
aim is to maximise power and influence.  This differs from leadership by conscious where 
the aim is to achieve normative goals.   
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The study of political leadership has recently become re-established as the focus of systematic 
academic attention within political science, after years of neglect.  Writings on the significance of 
political leaders may date back to Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Augustine, Erasmus and Machiavelli 
(Kane and Patapan 2014, 3), but it was widely recognised to have been given disproportionately little 
prominence in the study of politics and overviews of the discipline (Foley 2013, 7-9).  Writing in 1987, 
Jean Blondel remarked that it was ‘prima facie surprising that a general analysis of [political 
leadership]… should be so little advanced’ (Blondel 1987, 1).   
Fast-forward thirty years and a new range of conceptual frameworks have evolved to understand 
political leadership (Bennister, ‘t Hart, and Worthy 2015; Elgie 1995; Helms 2012; Kane and Patapan 
2014; Rhodes and t'Hart 2014; Strangio, Hart, and Walter 2013).  A prominent debate within this 
scholarship has developed about how prime ministerial and party leadership should be understood 
and assessed (Bennister, ‘t Hart, and Worthy 2014; Buller and James 2012; Byrne, Randall, and 
Theakston 2017; Greenstein 2009; Heppell 2014; Royal Holloway Group 2015; Theakston and Gill 
2006; Theakston 2011; Theakston and Gill 2011).  One leading framework for assessing political 
leaders is the neo-statecraft approach.  Built on foundations laid by Jim Bulpitt (1986), this argued that 
leaders should be assessed in terms of whether they win office and achieve a sense of governing 
competence.  Yet it has been criticised for, among other things, rarely being subjected to empirical 
knowledge and being untestable.   
Pawson and Tilley (1997) have developed methods from within critical realism to evaluate theory, 
however.   This article uses their concept of the realistic interview to assess neo-statecraft theory by 
asking political leaders themselves to reflect on neo-statecraft theory.  Unprecedented, original 
interviews with former British party leaders were undertaken in which they were employed as ‘co-
researchers,’ asking them to evaluate the framework.  The argument of this article is that the 
interviews provide support for assessing leaders in statecraft terms because it is sensitive to the key 
structural dilemma that leaders face: winning office is a pre-requisite to making social change.  This 
and other causal mechanisms at the heart of the theory were supported in the interviews.  However, 
interviewees also provided some causes for criticism of the model because other generative 
mechanisms were found to be motivating leaders, that neo-statecraft theory did not directly 
acknowledge.  In short, a leader’s broader public and social value is not recognised. Statecraft is 
therefore argued to be useful for assessing one type of leadership.  It focusses purely on cunning 
leadership where the aim is to maximise power and influence.  This differs from leadership by 
conscious where the aim is to achieve normative goals.  The complete leader, however, will need to 
achieve by cunning and conscious leadership, and for that reason neo-statecraft theory is useful.  The 
article therefore seeks to make an original contribution by testing and revising a prominent theory for 
understanding political leadership of relevance for all parliamentary democracies.  New evidence is 
provided in support of the model and a matrix for the challenges that leaders face is identified.  
However, the limits of the model are more demarcated. More widely, it contributes a new approach 
to how elite theories based in critical realism can be subjected to empirical knowledge using interviews 
with a rare application and adaption of Pawson and Tilley’s work. 
Part 1 of this article describes how neo-statecraft came to be used to understand political leadership 
and assess leaders in parliamentary democracies.  Part 2 discusses the challenges involved in assessing 
critical realist theory and outlines Pawson and Tilley’s approach.  The section explains why their 
concept of the realistic interview could be used in the study of elites.  Part 3 then outlines the methods 
used in more detail.  Part 4 explains the themes that emerged from the interviews while and Part 5 
discusses whether these are evidence in support of the statecraft thesis or counter to it.   
Political Leadership as Statecraft 
Neo-statecraft theory began from the work of Jim Bulpitt.   His famous Statecraft thesis was first stated 
in 1986 as a contribution to a debate on Margaret Thatcher and ‘Thatcherism’ (Bulpitt 1986).  Bulpitt 
argued that Margaret Thatcher was a politician driven by political expediency, making short term 
tactical moves to win elections rather than a leader driven by an ideological raison d’etre.  In more 
general terms, he argued, political leaders are primarily interested in statecraft: ‘the art of winning 
elections and achieving some necessary degree of governing competence in office’ (Bulpitt 1986, 21).  
Bulpitt therefore conceptualised party leaders as be self-interested, rational and cohesive actors.  
They will seek to achieve this through the use of ‘governing codes’ which are a ‘set of relatively 
coherent principles or rules underlying policies and policy related behaviour’ (Bulpitt 1996, 1097) and 
‘a set of political support mechanisms designed to protect and promote the code and objectives’ 
(Bulpitt 1996, 1097).  Bulpitt’s original support mechanisms were party management, a winning 
electoral strategy, political argument hegemony, and most importantly, governing competence 
(Bulpitt 1986, 22).  Leaders operated within a structural context, that Bulpitt called a ‘natural rate of 
governability’, which affected their ability to achieve successful statecraft (Bulpitt 1988, 185). 
The statecraft approach has been asserted to be a useful method for assessing political leaders (Buller 
and James 2012).  One advantage was that it allowed the key structural constraint that leaders faced, 
the need to keep winning elections, into consideration when we assess political leaders.  In the winner-
takes-all environment of British politics there is no prizes for second place.  As Bulpitt expressed 
himself: ‘Party leaders must…aim to win general elections simply because the consequences of 
defeat…are so awful’ (Bulpitt 1988, 188).  Moreover, according to Bulpitt:   
‘[T]hese structural characteristics of modern British politics have produced party elites with 
common, initial, subsistence-level objectives, namely winning national office, avoiding too many 
problems while there and getting re-elected (Bulpitt 1996, 225). 
A second advantage of the approach is that it treats leadership as a collective exercise (2012, 538-9).  
Executive decision-making is never collegial, and rarely will an individual leader be responsible for the 
leadership of a government.  There will be a small number of senior ministers or advisors who will 
form a clique and act as a unitary actor over time.  Bulpitt’s focus was therefore on the ‘Court’ (a term 
used to refer to the ‘the formal Chief Executive plus his/her political friends and advisors’ (Bulpitt 
1995, 518)).  
Bulpitt’s original statecraft approach has been subject to criticism.   Firstly, the body of work that he 
wrote was light, often unpublished and sometimes contradictory, claimed Rhodes and Tiernan (2013), 
arguing that he was ‘no system builder’.  Secondly, Griffiths has argued that statecraft theory reduces 
ideology and values to ‘a means for gaining power’ but this is an over-simplistic account of the complex 
motivations of leaders.  For him:   
‘this does not seem to ring true as an explanation for the role of ideology in politicians’ lives… it does not 
simply seem to be the case that ideologies are no more than instruments to be picked up, tried and dropped 
at will, in a bid to win elections’ (Griffiths 2016, 738).   
Thirdly, the approach has been claimed to be untestable.  Griffiths argues that ‘politicians rarely chose 
to describe their actions in terms of Statecraft, preferring to provide other grander justifications for 
their actions’ (Griffiths 2016, 739).  Researchers therefore defend a statecraft account despite 
contrary evidence.  He suggests that there is therefore ‘no appropriate methodology to apply 
Statecraft theory.’  Elsewhere, Rhodes has previously claimed there is no counterfactual to the 
approach (Rhodes 1988, 33) and even Bulpitt accepted that ‘…the thesis [is] untestable, [it] cannot be 
disproved’ (Bulpitt 1983, 239).  Fourthly, critics have asked whether Bulpitt’s support mechanisms are 
in fact those which will secure successful statecraft.  Why has governing competence been selected 
over and above all other factors?  What role is there, for example, for personality (Griffiths 2016, 739-
40)? 
The Neo-Statecraft Approach 
Newer scholarship, acknowledging and responding to some of these criticisms, has built upon Bulpitt’s 
foundations.  A newer neo-statecraft approach has therefore been articulated (James 2016).     
The starting point is to ground the approach epistemologically and ontologically in the critical realism.  
Although there is variation and tension between critical realist authors, there are common points, 
from which neo-statecraft proceeds.  Foremost, it holds that there are multiple domains of reality – 
not all of which the researcher has direct access.  The domain of the empirical realm, consists of 
experienced events which are directly observable.  However, there are also the actual realm, 
consisting of events and experiences (not all of which are experienced), and the real which consists of 
the generative mechanisms (which are unobservable) (Archer 1982; Archer 1995; Bhaskar 2008; 
Jessop 2005; Joseph and Wight 2010).  Using critical realism is useful because it overcomes the 
criticism of a lack of falsifiability.  Such a criticism, is positivist criticism.  The value of falsifiability is set 
out in key positivist works (for example: King, Keohane, and Verba 1994) and is commonly held, but it 
is inappropriate for a framework of this type.   Critical realism also important because it provides a 
way of conceptualising of the relationship between structure and agency. In the neo-statecraft model 
Bulpitt’s original concept of the natural rate of governability is dropped as it lacks development in 
favour of an approach anchored critical realism.  The neo-statecraft approach borrows from Bob 
Jessop’s (2001) strategic-relational approach in arguing that Courts are ‘reflective and purposive 
agents…[within a]…strategically selective environment’ (James 2016, 94-6).ii 
Secondly, there has been some work to provide a clearer way to operationalise some of the concepts 
that Jim Bulpitt originally developed for empirical research.  Work from electoral studies and 
comparative party politics has been used to provide a way in which concepts such as governing 
competence and party management could be assessed (Buller and James 2012).  New concepts have 
been added based on empirical research.  Courts are argued to often seek to change the constitution 
to maximise their chances of successful statecraft.  Bending the rules of the game is therefore a fifth 
support mechanism that they will seek to achieve and by which they should be evaluated (James 
2012). 
Thirdly, neo-statecraft has been carefully delimitated from rational choice theory and situated within 
historical institutionalism.  Rational choice theorists make actors’ rational and self-interested 
behaviour an a priori assumption to the analysis.  For neo-statecraft theorists, however, the motives 
of elites derive from the institutional landscape in which they operate (James 2016).  The winner takes 
all environment enforces a Darwinian logic in which they must fight for office or lose their job.   
Fourthly, elites will not always act in a self-interested way.  The extent to which they do so is 
contingent upon their knowledge of policy options and may require external triggers. There is an elite 
policy-agenda with peaks and troughs in the issue attention of the Court in any given policy area 
(James 2012, 209-22; 27-30). 
Using the Realistic Interview to Study Elites 
These points aside, it remains the case that neo-statecraft theory has not been regularly tested against 
empirical evidence and there is further scope for doing so.  But we are left with a troubling question: 
how can the theory be tested? A common point within critical realism is that conventional positivist 
methods are not appropriate for testing theories for two reasons.  Firstly, generative mechanisms may 
not be directly observable because they may operate in the real domain.  Secondly, a focus on whether 
the data ‘fits’ with predicted hypotheses is not appropriate.  The absence of a correlation doesn’t 
disprove the presence of a regularity because mechanisms are contingent (Miller and Tsang 2011).  
Andrew Sayer consequently suggests that theory evaluation more closely approximates making 
‘judgments of superiority and inferiority’ rather than definitive falsifications (Sayer 2010, 206).   
Similarly, the methods used by many political scientists might not seem to be appropriate.  Semi-
structured interviewing is a common approach that used in social science research for identifying 
causal relationships and critically examining theories (Berry 2003; McEvoy 2006; Richards 1996).  
However, it is a problematic approach when used with elite actors.  There is the risk that individuals 
may wish to paint themselves in the best possible light and not answer truthfully.  This is especially 
the case for elite politicians who are skilled at promoting their public image.  Elite activity commonly 
takes place in actual and real domains of reality.  The stated opinions of politicians, that which is 
experienced in the empirical realm, therefore misses what is unobservable.   
One methodology that has been developed to test realist theories, however, is the realist interview, 
developed by Ray Pawson and Nick Tilley (1997, 153-82).  This was originally developed to evaluate 
theories about public policy programmes, but is argued here to be helpful for elite interviewing.  
Pawson and Tilley differentiated between the types of knowledge that practitioners and subjects have 
compared to external evaluators.  External evaluators (academics) come with theories which provide 
‘a common explanatory blueprint’.  They can draw from previous studies and use social science theory.  
But they are not exposed to the generative mechanisms in the way that subjects and practitioners are.  
Interviewing subjects is therefore a vital research tool for testing theories about those mechanisms as 
lived experiences.  
The realistic interview differs to the orthodox interview because the aim is not to obtain objective 
information about the interviewee or their behaviour as such.  An important point of departure with 
standard interview approaches is that ‘the subject and the subject matter are not one and the same 
thing’ (p.155).   Instead, ‘the researcher’s theory is the subject matter of the interview, and the subject 
(stakeholder) is there to confirm, to falsify and, above all, to refine that theory’ (1997, 155).  The 
subject is not therefore the quality of the leader’s tenure, but the quality of the theory.  Interviewees 
can of course draw from the experience from their tenure to illustrate points about the theory.  
Interviewees are employed as co-researchers in testing and revising theory. 
The interviewer has two key processes using the realistic interview.  The first is the teacher-learner 
function in which the interviewer teaches the interviewee the conceptual structure of a theory.  The 
theory and working hypotheses are not hidden from the interviewee in the way that they are 
commonly are in orthodox interviews for fear of having leading questions and balance.  The second is 
conceptual refinement process where the interviewee delivers their own thoughts in the ‘context of, 
and (perhaps) as a correction to, the researcher’s own theory’ and are given ‘an opportunity to explain 
and clarify that thinking’ (p.168).  This allows them to agree with the rationale of the generative 
mechanisms and give examples of events which might provide evidence of them.  But it also allows 
them to refine and challenge the framework. 
It is argued here that this is a useful approach for subjecting elite theories to empirical testing in 
addition to the purposes that Pawson and Tilley original developed it for.  Firstly, elite actors have 
unique lived experiences which researchers do not have and are better able to attest to the challenges 
and experiences that they faced.  If elite activity exists in the actual real domain because it is secretive 
and involves entrenched interests, then elite actors are well placed to discuss them.  Secondly, the 
subject of the interview is not the elite actor themselves so that there is less direct repetitional cost 
to them and they can ‘give away’ what information they want and this may lead to a more open 
conversation.   
Falsification in the positivist sense cannot either be achieved or sought through this process.  There 
remains an element of interpretation of the data collected, criticality of the subject on behalf of the 
researcher is needed and analysis/discussion of the implications for theory.  Elite actors may still 
decline to reveal sensitive information and might be unware of the phenomenon from the real and 
actual realms of reality.  But this approach still holds some promise in allowing theories to be subject 
to empirical knowledge. As Colin Hay puts it, research can be ‘empirical but not empiricist’ (Hay 2002). 
 
Methods 
The article makes a unique contribution by using Tilley and Pawson’s methods which have not been 
used in the study of political leadership before.  These methods are used to assess the utility of the 
neo-statecraft framework for evaluating leaders.  Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
past former leaders of the main three nationwide UK political parties between 1983 and 2010 (Table 
1).  The interviewees were semi-structured and lasted for around an hour in length.  They centred 
around three research questions, which are the research questions for this article: 
- Is the neo-statecraft framework a ‘fair’ test for a political leader in Britain?  
- Are the statecraft support mechanisms the most important ones? 
- What are the key features of the structural context that leaders face? 
Interviewees were therefore provided with a draft book chapter which outlined the statecraft 
approach in advance of the interview.iii  Interviewees were asked how they thought contemporary 
party leaders should be judged and then asked to evaluate the theory, drawing from their own 
experience.  They were then asked questions relating to their own tenure using the framework as a 
way of ascertaining the sufficiency of the theory in how they narrated their time in office.  The chapter 
also outlined a range of factors that might make statecraft more or less difficult, by suggesting some 
causal mechanisms based on a brief literature review of the comparative politics literature.  These are 
provided in Table 2 but explained in more detail in the published chapters.  
Seven of the twelve leaders were interviewed, with at least two from the main parties, as listed in 
Table 1.  Other leaders of the three main parties were approached but declined to participate.  Leaders 
of smaller or nationalist parties were not included.  It is worth noting that only one was prime minister 
during this time (Tony Blair) but it was obviously for a very lengthy and significant period in British 
history.  In terms of sampling theory, the population is relatively small and a significant sample was 
achieved.  Although there is not a complete representative balance this is a very significant set of 
interviews given the difficulty that researchers inevitably face in accessing them. 
There were too few interviews to use a formal coding system.  However, the principles of thematic 
analysis were used to extract key themes under each of the questions set about.  Thematic analysis 
involves analysing texts for common patterns (themes) within qualitative text,  in response to 
particular questions (Braun and Clarke 2012).  It is commonly used within psychology but has also 
been used within political science.  Importantly, it is not the number of utterances of a theme that is 
significant because the importance of a meaning cannot be reduced to the frequency with which it 
stated.  Importantly, it is compatible with realist and constructivist research because the researcher is 
required to search for both semantic and latent meanings in the text.  This inevitably involves 
judgement on behalf of the researcher and might be considered an interpretation of the data.  In the 
following results section, quotes were selected thematically from the texts to identify the core themes 
from the interviews. 
 
 Leader Party  General elections 
fought 
Time in Office as Leader 
Tony Blair  Labour 3 2 May 1997 – 27 June 2007 
Neil Kinnock Labour 2 2 October 1983 – 18 July 1992 
Michael 
Howard 
Conservative  1 6 November 2003 – 6 December 2005 
William 
Hague 





2 16 July 1988 – 11 August 1999 
David Steel Liberal Party / 
Liberal 
Democrats 
3 7 July 1976 – 16 July 1988, 3 March 
1988 – 16 July 1988 
Nick Clegg Liberal 
Democrats 
1 18 December 2007 – 16 July 2015 












Table 2: Contextual Factors in the Assessment of Statecraft 
 
Statecraft task Contextual factors 
Winning electoral 
strategy 
• Party resources and campaign infrastructure 
• Unfavourable electoral laws (constituencies, election 
administration, electoral system, party finance) 
• Partisan alignment of the press 
• Ability to call election when polls are favourable 
Governing 
competence 
• Party reputation 
• Conditions for successful economic growth 
• Foreign policy disputes 
• Time in office 
Party management • Presence of credible rival leaders 
• Rules for dethroning 
• Levels of party unity 
• Available mechanisms for party discipline 
• Time in office 
Political argument 
hegemony 
• Ideological developments at the international level 
• Alignment of the press 
• Available off-the-shelf strategies in the ‘garbage can’ 
• Developments in the party system 
• Time in office 
Bending the rules of 
the game 
• Presence of policy triggers or favourable conditions to 
enact (or prevent) change 
Traditional concepts used by positivists have also been adapted for assessing realist theory which are 
useful reference points for the analysis.  Smith and Johnston (2014), sketch out how the concepts 
validity, commonly used in positivist social science can equally be used to test theories based in critical 
realism. However, the concepts have different meanings.  When undertaking critical realist theory 
therefore are four useful measurements of validity.  Measurement validity is ‘a logical assessment of 
the relationship between data and event’ (p.17) which involves looking at the chain of evidence and 
whether is sufficient evidence to detect the event.  Internal validity is evidence that the proposed 
generative mechanism has been triggered to cause an effect.  Ecological validity is evidence that the 
mechanism theorised by research is reflected of practice.  Lastly, external validity is evidence that the 
mechanism causes the events in the domain, also causes external events.  These concepts will be 
referred to in the analysis of the theory, which follows the results section.  
Results and Analysis 
The centrality of statecraft  
The discussion of the interviews begins with the question of whether the interviewees thought 
statecraft to be a good test of political leadership.  Is ‘good’ British party leadership all about power 
and statecraft?   
The leaders were clear that there were other objectives outside of statecraft that were important.  
Leaders were clear that they had a variety of aims, each of which could be tests of their leadership, 
with some reservations made about the statecraft approach.   Not all leaders entered politics wanting 
to become leaders.  They were often affected by the context of their times and wanted to bring about 
positive social change either in policy or ideological terms.  William Hague explained that:   
‘growing up in South Yorkshire… with a small business background, which was the family I was brought up in. 
The context was one of widespread nationalised industries, large local authorities, considerable state housing 
and Britain being the so-called, ‘sick man of Europe’.  You really felt change was necessary’ 
Meanwhile, Nick Clegg suggested that he was inspired by the anti-apartheid movement and was 
mobilised by the divisiveness of Margaret Thatcher’s policies and politics.  Leaders, Michael Howard 
suggested, typically want to ‘make a difference and make your community a better place’.  These 
differences could be on specific policies.  Neil Kinnock said that by the age of 12 or 13 he wanted to 
work to address poverty.  Describing those days, he said that: 
‘There was poverty, illness that occurred particularly amongst people who had had a poor upbringing, 
shortages of food, people permanently cold, and people with too little schooling.  Around the area I could 
see ugliness imposed upon beauty and considered that all these things could and should be put aside…. That's 
why I became political and that's why I joined the Labour Party.  But there was no personal aspiration in it.  
There was an ambition to secure change and collective means was the only route available for doing that.‘ 
Michael Howard was partly motivated in more ideological terms: 
‘from the time I started to think about politics, I always rejected socialism. It seemed to me that it was 
basically misguided and that the right way forward was to encourage the individual rather than to seek 
collective answers to the challenges that every community faces.’ 
Leadership was also thought of in more abstract terms. Leadership is, according to Tony Blair about 
setting a vision for a country in a changing international environment. He argued that:   
‘I think that the most important criteria is that you have a clear vision for the country and where it goes, and 
are prepared to locate that vision of the country in an understanding of how the future is going to work.’ 
One part of this was developing a domestic agenda which involved, what Blair described as the 
necessary reform of welfare and public services.  The other part, he suggested, was reflecting and 
acting on the question of: 
‘What is your country’s place in the world today?  How does it maximise its influence?  Without 
engaging in criticism of the recent leadership, it is hard to see where Britain fits today in the world 
that is developing and that is a significant challenge’. 
Leaders were also inspired by other leaders to enter politics.  For Hague, for example, this was 
Thatcher.  For Kinnock it was Bevan.   
The central theme, however, was that achievement of power was a key criterion for success and 
statecraft was therefore a fair test.  While Tony Blair suggested that there were other measures of 
success, statecraft was a pre-requisite for this: 
‘It is an important test of a leader that you are sufficiently politically competent and astute so that you are in 
a position that you can lead.  If you lose the election, then no one is going to end up asking that question 
about you particularly….  There will always be something in politics that will be about being sufficiently 
competent in the business of politics so that you are able to win and that will involve compromises and trade-
offs and so on.’ 
The importance of winning power was also shared by Liberal leaders too, leaders who have historically 
had much lower expectations for vote share and could never have been expected to win power 
outright for themselves.  For Paddy Ashdown: 
‘Listen, there’s only one answer I can give you on that, which is how close did they get to power? 
David Steel argued that ‘there can only be one criterion and that is: how successful were they 
in terms of seats [sic].’   Meanwhile, Nick Clegg, claimed that:   
 ‘I’ve always been a politician who believes that in politics you’ve got to grab the opportunity to put your 
views and your beliefs into practice. I still feel that very strongly. So I was unambiguously of the view that the 
Liberal Democrats should seek to make the journey from opposition into government’ 
For this reason, there was considerable support for the premise of the neo-statecraft approach, that 
winning elections, or moving your party towards that goal, is the primary criteria against which leaders 
should be judged: 
Neil Kinnock: ‘In the end it’s about winning elections. There are contributing factors but in the end they are 
covered broadly by the statecraft criteria. But nothing replaces winning elections.’  
 
William Hague: ‘Well overall I think yes… do think overall, flexibly interpreted, it’s a fair framework.  ‘ 
Without winning elections, any wider goal such as enacting positive social change was not possible.  
Ashdown argued that: 
‘I could see no point in this great philosophy of Liberalism reduced to being a furry little animal on the edges 
of British politics, proposing good ideas that other people borrowed from and being satisfied with simply 
opposing. The party had to be prepared to take the risk of being in government in order to implement the 
things we believed in, to change the condition of people’s lives. I’ve always wanted to move the party towards 
power and away from just opportunism and oppositionalism.’ 
Although unsaid, it is implied that they would be expected to resign.  When asked about the 
consequences of defeat, leaders thought that their position would often be untenable after defeat.  
However, it would usually depend on the margin of that defeat and previous expectations.  For an 
opposition leader, William Hague explained:  
‘I think if you are in my position, or Neil Kinnock's position in the 1980s, people understand that it would 
likely take two terms to get back into government… however, you can't lose in opposition for more than two 
terms’.   
‘Rules of thumb’ therefore develop within the party and Westminster as to what would be an 
acceptable ‘progress’ on the previous general election or mitigating circumstances.  Howard reflected 
that he had decided that if he had lost in 2005 but ‘managed to destroy the overall majority then I 
would stay’ but if Labour won with ‘an overall majority then I would go.’  
 
Revising the support mechanisms 
In order to win office or move your party in that direction, the neo-statecraft model suggests that five 
support key tasks should be achieved, admittedly with varying importance.  The leaders generally 
agreed that the mechanisms proposed by neo-statecraft theory were accurate depictions of the tasks 
that they faced.  Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Tony Blair though that governing competence was 
‘absolutely a precondition of winning again’.  As a result: 
‘I was obsessive about the notion that we had to show in the first term, we had to establish the 
credibility to govern.  Therefore you have to be careful.’   
Conservative leaders Howard and Hague agreed that it was to a large extent it was ‘the economy 
stupid’ that shaped the results of elections and a focus on governing competence was therefore right.  
But it was the perception of competence that mattered, and not necessarily reality.  Both stressed 
how the economy was doing well in 1997, but as Howard put it:  
‘the visuals of our emergence from the ERM and Norman Lamont standing on the threshold of the Treasury 
were so entrenched in people’s minds that what was actually happening in the economy didn't cut through.’ 
The importance of party management was unquestioned.  As Kinnock expressed it: ‘Divided, irresolute 
and self-obsessed parties have no appeal to the electorate’.  Moreover, poor management of the party 
can quickly undermine the credibility of leader for governing competence, especially when in 
opposition, and it is not possible to establish a record by governing.  Party management had a 
particular importance for the Liberals, argued Clegg as it threatened the future of the party and 
reacted to prevent this.   
‘I had made the obvious observation that every time Liberals in the past had gone anywhere near 
the other parties, like a moth to a flame they had always suffered – but where suffering would 
have turned into semi-terminal catastrophe would be if the party had split. I have many, many 
flaws but I was very, very assiduous: I would be at every week’s parliamentary party meeting, I 
would constantly try and absorb all the narkiness and bitchiness, the backbiting that you 
constantly get in politics, not least from your own side.’ 
Constitutional management (or ‘bending the rules of the game’), was stressed too.  Kinnock pointed 
out that:  
 
‘When I first entered Parliament in 1970 the question of the constitutional implications of a policy 
or strategy wouldn't have been asked. Now you've got to ask it.  This is a new idea in British politic 
- certainly since Ireland in the 1920s or – to a lesser extent – Europe in the ‘70s.   It should be one 
of the test questions for leaders: Is what you are about to do in this innocuous Green Paper going 
eventually to lead to an absolute car crash?’   
 
Moreover, the failure to achieve the statecraft support mechanisms often contributed to the leader’s 
downfall.  Kinnock reflected that he failed to win the battle of ideas on key policy areas and this 
undermined his chances of success: 
‘I don't think that I or my colleagues, but certainly I, sought to really fight the battle of ideas. That 
was partly because I didn't sufficiently believe in the significance of doing so. I should have 
believed in that more, especially since, as it turned out, I had eight years to play with. From the 
start we thought that winning was going to take “a two innings match” – and I should have taken 
the “ideas bat” to the crease. … This is not a mistake that Tony Blair, Alistair Campbell and their 
associates made….They started to build a narrative…. I didn't do it and I think that was in the end 
something I paid the price for.’  
 
Although Kinnock would have been unlikely to have known Bulpitt’s work at the time, he was asked 
whether, in retrospect, he was working statecraft criteria in mind. Kinnock suggested:  
 
‘I should have known it in any case, whether someone had defined this criterion academically or not.’ 
 
Interviewees were keen to stress other support mechanisms in addition to those present in the 
framework that was presented to them. The ability to demonstrate competence in foreign policy, as 
well as economic policy was put forward, although arguably this is covered by the concept of 
governing competence since this refers to all policy areas.  A second suggestion was, for Hague, 
building long term capacity and institutional strength in the party.  Hague bemoaned those leaders 
who left the party infrastructure in such a poor state that success for their successors would be 
challenging.  This arguably should therefore be considered a key component of party management in 
the model.  Lastly, and related, it was suggested that building institutional capacity in local 
government was important.  Hague argued that ‘active and numerous councillors with a ward level 
organisation are important for fighting campaigns’:   
‘I gave a lot of attention to party recruitment in local government. I spent, what would have been 
for most leaders in those circumstances, an excessive amount of time on local government… Now, 
strength in local government happens almost of its own accord in opposition, but not entirely of 
its own accord. You need to put some time in.’ 
 
This point was also stressed in the Liberal interviews.  Again, this may therefore need greater 
recognition as a part of developing a winning electoral strategy in the model and the evaluation of 
leaders using the framework.   
The structural context 
As noted above, a review of the literature was undertaken to identify some circumstances (or 
generative mechanisms) that could (dis)advantages leaders.  There were no direct points of 
disagreement with those presented to them.  Instead, additional challenges were stressed.  The 
importance of contingency and context was continually stressed.  As Howard suggested:  
 
‘looking at election performances is a bit too mechanical.  It doesn't really give full weight to what you call 
context and what I would call events’.   
 
The Miner’s Strike was cited as a challenging turn of events for Kinnock, while Steel argued that the 
Falklands War ‘wiped domestic politics off the map’ and hindered his progress in the 1983 election. 
 
Discussion focussed on governing competence, party management and developing a winning electoral 
strategy and the relationship between these support mechanisms.  When it came to governing 
competence it was noted that this was exceptionally difficult for parties in opposition to develop a 
reputation.  The support mechanism remained important, but demonstrating competence required 
the government of the day to fail to demonstrate success.  It can also take a long time for the public’s 
perception of a party to change, suggested Hague, pointing out that he suffered from the Tories’ blow 
to their reputation five years earlier and Labour’s difficulties after 2007/8. 
 
Party management can be made more difficult by internal party antagonism to potential partners.  For 
example, Ashdown found that many within his party had developed ‘quite a strong antipathy to any 
closer relationship with Blair.’  Parties can develop internal cultures which are resistant to change.  
‘The Labour Party has gone through the birth of quins,’ suggested Kinnock, ‘every time it has become 
apparent that a big societal or political change is on’.  Creating a party culture can be a challenge when 
parties merge, as the SDP and Liberals did.  Party management can also be time intensive with leaders 
needing to spend sufficient time massage egos, and visiting policy committees or executive meetings.  
Leaders who take over opposition parties who have been in recently been in power can be left to 
manage, as Hague noted:    
 
‘”big names” who were substantial figures in previous governments but you need to move on from 
them. I gave a lot of time and attention to reshuffles, to changing the personnel of the party.’ 
 
A common challenge in developing a winning electoral strategy, suggested some of the leaders, is that 
public opinion can quickly shift.  Changing an image can be difficult and needs to be done from the 
start, but ‘decisions that you have taken earlier on, by the time you have got to the election, narrow 
your options very considerably,’ Howard explained, and by then it is ‘too late’.  Blair argued that this 
was one of Attlee’s failures: 
 
‘With Attlee, you see, I don’t think that they noticed early enough that the public was moving on 
from the rationing era after the war.  They did not quite get that the public did not just want a 
continuation of this time where ‘the state must protect us’.  Six years on from 1945, the public had 
moved on from that, frankly.’  
Public opinion can also come into conflict with party opinion, presenting a conflict with the party 
management mechanism. As Kinnock noted, this presented him with the: 
 
‘constant dilemma of having a party that was so distant from the electorate, including people who 
actually cherished that distance, meant that if you appealed, even in modest and convincing terms 
to the party, you were going to get caricatured by the press and therefore misunderstood by the 
electorate. If you went straight for the electorate then you were going to get serious frictions and 
distractions in the party.’ 
 
The party’s track immediate past electoral record can leave the leader well or weakly positioned to 
force change in the electoral strategy.  According to Blair: 
‘Now, maybe I was lucky.  One of the things that I often wonder about is if I had been leader of 
the Labour Party when they had spent four years in opposition.  It might have been a different 
task!  After eighteen years of opposition – all but the dumbest could work out that we are 
obviously doing something wrong.  So the space was there for someone to say, look, I know where 
we are going, we are going this way, and provided it seemed to work, people were more less happy 
to go virtually anywhere.’ 
While some leaders thought that the blaming the media for poor coverage or misrepresentation 
would be making excuses, others thought that expressions of concern were legitimate.  Clegg argued 
that his party faced the ‘wrath of the press’ while he was in government as they were: ‘offensive to 
their business model, so they have to turn on us – and boy, did they’.  The Liberal leaders also claimed 
that it was often more difficult to ‘get noticed.’   
 
Discussion and Analysis 
Returning to the first of the three core research questions - is the neo-statecraft framework a ‘fair’ 
test for a political leader in Britain?   One the core arguments made by Buller and James in favour of 
using the statecraft thesis to assess leaders was that it ‘goes some way towards incorporating a sense 
of structural context into our evaluation of leadership performance’ (Buller and James 2012, 534).  For 
them ‘the most obvious element of this environment was the electoral constraint facing all politicians’ 
(Buller and James 2012, 539).  The core generative mechanism at the heart of the statecraft thesis is 
electoral constraint.  The need to win elections was fundamental to achieving any other leadership 
goal.  There was clear support in the leadership interviews for this.  In conceptual terms, there was a 
significant amount of measurement, internal and ecological validity with the generative mechanism 
playing out in the real world.  This is one of the harder things for a leader to admit: that their actions 
are driven, at least in part, by the need to win elections.  This is perhaps not a surprising finding.  
However, it is very significant because most of the theories used to assess political leadership do not 
have this criteria or causal mechanism as part of the theoretical framework. 
At the same time, leaders were keen to stress the limits of statecraft theory.  They wanted to achieve 
more normative and altruistic goals as leaders.  For Hague and Clegg especially, there was some 
evidence that individual experiences of events early in their lives leading to them form normative 
positions, which are in part ideological, which partly motivated their actions as leaders.  Leaders also 
commonly reflect on these in their own biographies (Ashdown 2010; Blair 2010).  Blair’s focus in the 
interviews on public sector reform and international statesmanship reflect a merging of ideological 
goals and leadership assessments.  This is all evidence that leaders being motivated by factors other 
than pure power.  In critical realist terminology, there are other generative mechanisms at play.  The 
was claim made by some of the leaders that the theory is incomplete as a measure of leadership 
success because it does not directly allow a leader’s broader public and social value to be recognised 
should therefore be accepted, especially since it overlaps with academic criticisms of the theory 
described in the literature review – Griffiths’ claim that leaders are also driven by ideology.   It 
therefore seems necessary to recognise the importance, value and distinctiveness of the neo-
statecraft in measuring cunning political leadership – the extent to which a leader is successful in 
winning power, office and influence. It is not a test of leadership led by conscience – where the aims, 
chosen methods and outcomes that are principled and morally good. Complete leadership will need 
to achieve both cunning and conscious leadership (figure 1).   Successful statecraft, however, remains 
an important pre-requisite for realising many moral goal, especially in majoritarian political systems 
such as the UK, and for that reason statecraft theory is useful. 
  
Figure 1: The three C’s of leadership: cunning, conscious and complete 
 
Secondly, are the statecraft support mechanisms the most important ones?  Generally, there was little 
in the interviews to suggest that the support mechanisms were inaccurate.  In fact, interviewees 
seemed to find them very useful for framing a discussion of their own leadership fortunes.  As noted 
above, only one interview went on to become prime minister so different views may have come from 
other leaders.  There is also the risk of ‘group think’: leaders’ views were not formed independent of 
each other, but were created within a particular period of time when they were often in direct 
electoral competition. But governing competence, the most important support mechanism in Bulpitt’s 
thesis, was dominant across the interviews, and was important even with leaders who didn’t expect 
to become prime minister.  The interviews therefore go some way to responding  the criticism made 
of the choice of support mechanisms by Griffiths that ‘it is unclear why those factors help to achieve 
the goal of ‘winning elections and demonstrating governing competence’ rather than others (Griffiths 
2016, 739).   
Thirdly, what are the key features of the structural context that leaders face?  Few interviewees 
directly disagreed with the factors provided, but the discussions also suggested a wider proliferation 
of possible challenges – an infinity of scenarios in which different types of generative mechanisms, 







on the evidence presented in this article, Table 2 therefore represents a first step forward in 
identifying some of the crucial contextual factors that can make statecraft more difficult to achieve.  
Before closing this discussion, an ethnographic reflection can be added on how the interviewees 
engaged with the interview process and theory.  The interviews were analysed above using textual 
analysis.  Being there, however, the researcher is given an impression of the sincerity, seriousness and 
guardedness of the interviewee and the answers.  The view of the researcher was that Michael 
Howard, interviewed in a committee room in the House of Lords, was the more guarded, sceptical and 
cautious respondent.  The other interviewees were impressively engaged.  William Hague and Neil 
Kinnock strikingly spoke much more freely and with admirable introspective self-criticism.  William 
Hague, himself writing about political leaders, at the time (Hague 2005, 2012) seemed to connect his 
own personal experience with abstract thinking. Arguably, their answers could therefore be given 
greater weight.  Importantly, the seriousness with which the interviewees took the process and the 
additional insights learned above suggests that the realistic interview is a useful research method that 
could be used more widely with elites. 
Conclusions 
Leaders can have profound effects on people, economies, states and environments around the world. 
This article has sought to assess one of the leading approaches used to assessing political leaders: neo-
statecraft theory.  Critical realists such as Andrew Sayer stress that academic knowledge and theory is 
imperfect.  Academics can only attempt to gain knowledge of the object of study within the cognitive 
and conceptual resources available in the language communities.  Their ability to gain understanding 
of the object of study is therefore bounded by the availability of conceptual frameworks and language 
(Sayer 2010, 24).  Academic knowledge should not be assumed to be the highest form of knowledge, 
Sayer warns, since knowledge generation is also a practical task.  Those who work in the real-world of 
politics therefore have important knowledge that should be mined.  This article has therefore sought 
to use an innovative but largely underused method, to realign theory and praxis.  Past leaders were 
deployed as co-researchers to draw from their practical knowledge to appraise the theory in 
conversation with a researcher.  This is the first application of the realistic interview method to 
political leaders and elites. It is argued to overcome some methodological problems and could be used 
more widely in future with political elites.  
Overall, the interviews provide much reason to support the utility of the approach.  Most importantly, 
the interviews provided evidence in support of the generative mechanisms that lie at the heart of the 
model – the pressures to win office and demonstrate competence.  The concepts were not seriously 
challenged and provided leaders with a useful organising language for discussing the challenges that 
they faced.  The article has therefore made a crucial contribution by demonstrating some validity to 
the framework using empirical evidence.  Evidence of ecological validity has been demonstrated 
bringing leaders themselves to discuss theory.  External validity has been added by connecting the 
concepts and support mechanisms to the external literature from electoral studies and comparative 
politics on the determinants of voter behaviour, the management of parliaments etc.  The approach 
has also been further developed by providing an initial set of contextual challenges that leaders face.  
This needs refinement with further research.  It seems, however, that it seems that there are a greater 
and more complex range of elite-level circumstances that can (dis)advantage a party leader than their 
relationship with broader political-economic regimes, important as that is (Byrne, Randall, and 
Theakston 2017). 
The interviews suggest that there are other causal mechanisms at play in political leadership as well.  
Leaders can be driven by beliefs and ideas too.  Past experiences can lead them to enter politics to 
achieve goals, which might be normative and ideological in nature. The approach therefore does not 
provide an overall method of assessment because it only focusses on rewarding leaders for their 
electoral goals.  We should seek to evaluate leaders in terms broader than this.  We need to think 
about conscious leadership as well as cunning leadership.  The complete leader, will achieve both.   
Nonetheless, an acceptance that there are other generative mechanisms involved in leadership 
politics doesn’t mean that they are all equally important.  The need to win elections and the Darwinian 
nature of politics was central to the interviews and usually accepted as a pre-requisite for success party 
leadership in other dimensions.  The neo-statecraft approach therefore usefully centres analysis on 
the cunning dimension of leadership and is therefore a useful knowledge framework for academics, 
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